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ABSTRACT 
In this study we provide an up-to-date assessment of situations in which 
universities are bound by public procurement rules, as well as the combined changes that 
market-based university financing mechanisms can bring about in relation to the regulation 
of university procurement and to the treatment of the financial support they receive under 
the EU State aid rules. National differences in funding schemes are likely to trigger 
different answers in different EU jurisdictions. This study uses the situation of English 
universities as a case study. 
The first part focuses on the role of universities as buyers. The traditional position 
has been to consider universities bound by EU public procurement rules either as state 
authorities, or because they receive more than 50% public funding. In the latter case, recent 
changes in the funding structure can create opportunities for universities to free themselves 
from compliance with EU public procurement rules.  
In the second part, we assess the position of universities as providers. Here the 
traditional position has been that the State can directly mandate universities to conduct 
teaching and research activities. However, new EU legislation contains specific provisions 
about how and when teaching and research need to be procured if they are of an economic 
nature. Thus, accepting the exclusion of university services from procurement requirements 
as a rule of thumb is increasingly open to legal challenge.  
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Finally, the study assesses if and in how far universities can benefit from 
exemptions for public-public cooperation or in-house arrangements either as sellers or 
buyers.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper assesses the situations in which universities are currently bound by 
public procurement rules, as well as the combined changes that market-based university 
financing mechanisms can bring about in relation to the regulation of university 
procurement and to the treatment of the financial support they receive under the EU State 
aid rules. The paper looks at the interaction between universities and EU public 
procurement and State aid rules from the double perspective of universities as buyers (§2) 
and universities as suppliers or providers of services to other public entities (§3). The paper 
also focuses on the increased scope for universities to escape compliance with those rules in 
specific circumstances that may enable them to have recourse to the so called in-house and 
public-public cooperation exceptions under the 2014 EU public procurement rules (§4). 
The first part of the paper focuses on the role of universities as buyers (§2). 
Universities’ continued obligation to comply with EU public procurement rules when they 
purchase derives from their status as ‘contracting authorities’ under Directive 2014/24. The 
traditional position has been to consider universities bound by EU public procurement rules 
either because they are state authorities, or because they receive more than 50% of their 
funding from the State; either on a structural basis (making them bodies governed by public 
law) or regarding specific projects. Where universities are not public authorities in nature, 
changes in the way they are funded can create opportunities for universities to free 
themselves from compliance with EU public procurement rules when they acquire goods or 
commission services or works (§2.A). National differences in funding schemes are likely to 
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trigger different answers in different EU jurisdictions. This paper uses the UK situation 
and, more specifically, the case of English universities as a case study to discuss the 
position of universities as contracting authorities. In doing so it aims to assess whether, as 
has already been suggested by the UK’s Department of Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS)
3
, on-going changes in funding for English universities can actually allow them to lose 
their condition of ‘contracting authorities’ and, ultimately, stop being bound by EU public 
procurement rules—particularly due to the increasing importance of tuition fees, the lift in 
student number controls and the pressure for universities to raise other sorts of commercial 
revenue. This is an issue open to discussion because the latest analysis of the universities’ 
condition of contracting authorities by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
in University of Cambridge
4
 did not take into account any of these recent trends in 
university financing in England. It will be clear that the analysis ultimately relies on an 
assessment of whether tuition fees are ‘state funds’ or not, as well as on their relative 
importance vis-à-vis other sources of public and private funding. The former becomes more 
unclear where a system of student loans is operated that does not necessarily function in 
commercial terms, as is the case with the English Student Loans Company (SLC). This 
triggers a related discussion on whether the State is deemed to control the funds 
administered by such arms-length (private) student loans organisations, which is another 
hotly disputed area of EU economic law; in this case, State aid (§2.B).  
                                                 
3 See J Beresford-Jones, “Removal of cap on student numbers - will this affect universities' status as "contracting 
authorities"?”, 1 July 2015, Procurement Portal, available at 
http://www.procurementportal.com/blog/blog.aspx?entry=464&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&ut
m_campaign=Feed%3A+procurementportal%2Fblogfeed+%28Mills+%26+Reeve%3A+Procurement+Portal+blog
%29 (last accessed July 3, 2015). This issue has been in the political agenda for quite some time now. See A 
Albert, “Universities to be exempt from EU public procurement rules”, 5 October 2011, Supply Management, 
available at http://www.supplymanagement.com/news/2011/universities-to-be-exempt-from-eu-public-
procurement-rules#sthash.YfveQGXu.dpuf (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
4 Judgment of 3 October 2000 in University of Cambridge, C-380/98, EU:C:2000:529. 
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In the second part, the paper explores the position of universities as providers of 
services, or sellers (§3). Here the traditional position has been to consider that universities 
can provide a significant volume of services to the State, or to the general public, without 
having to comply with procurement requirements; ie that the State can directly mandate 
universities to conduct teaching and research activities, as well as award them specific 
types of R&D contracts excluded from the procurement Directives. However, recent 
developments might cast doubt on the continued validity of this traditional position. The 
new Framework for State Aid for Research and Development
5
 makes it clear that research 
which constitutes an economic activity has to be commissioned by means of a (quasi) 
procurement exercise in most cases. Directive 2014/24 equally contains specific provisions 
about how and when teaching and research needs to be procured. Thus, accepting the 
exclusion of university services from procurement requirements as a rule of thumb is 
increasingly open to legal challenge. At the same time, the possibility to regulate some or 
all university activities as either social services of general interest (SSGI) or services of 
general economic interest (SGEI) also creates complexity. This part of the paper thus 
assesses to what extent the commissioning of education and research services to 
universities needs to be subjected to procurement requirements (§3.A). It also looks at the 
application of State aid rules to the commissioning of these services when procurement is 
not required (§3.B).  
Finally, the paper stresses how even in those cases where, generally, public 
procurement would need to take place and bind the university as either a buyer or a seller, 
there are still exemptions for public-public cooperation or in-house arrangements that 
universities may try to benefit from (§4). These could respectively shield universities from 
competition by non-public and commercial providers when they are sellers, as well as allow 
them to avoid a public procurement procedure when they are buyers. For these exceptions 
to apply, there needs to be an element of control of the providing entity by the contracting 
                                                 
5 Commission Communication ‘Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation’ OJ [2014] 
C 198/01 (hereinafter referred to as new Research Framework). 
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authority. Thus, certain organisational decisions (such as university spin-offs of revenue-
making units) could provide a secondary opportunity for universities to avoid direct 
compliance with EU public procurement rules when acquiring goods or services from 
affiliated entities by means of public-public cooperation or in-house arrangements (§4.A). 
Differently, in the case of universities as providers and in view of their inherent autonomy, 
establishing control by other public sector entities interested in commissioning their 
services is a difficult task. Indeed, a literal interpretation of the recent Datenlotsen
6
 case 
might give the impression that control cannot be present in the university-state relationship, 
which would bar the use of in-house or public-public exemptions when universities act as 
providers. However, Directive 2014/24 explicitly allows non-market arrangements 
previously rejected by the CJEU (such as horizontal in-house situations) and there are 
indications that the control requirement may have been relaxed. The question therefore 
arises how these developments in the regulation of public-public and in-house exceptions in 
Article 12 of Directive 2014/24 relate to the Datenlotsen Judgment and, more generally, to 
what extent the CJEU will be willing to ring-fence procurement in favour of university 
providers (§4.B).  
The conclusions of the paper (§5) recapitulate our findings on the extent to which 
and the conditions under which universities are bound by EU public procurement rules as 
either buyers or providers. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Judgment of 8 May 2014 in Datenlotsen Informationssysteme, C-15/13, EU:C:2014:303. 
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2. UNIVERSITIES AS BUYERS 
 
From an EU law perspective, a university’s obligation to comply with the public 
procurement rules of Directive 2014/24
7
 crucially depends on its inclusion within the scope 
of coverage of the Directive
8
. Some English universities consider themselves bound to 
comply with EU public procurement rules
9
, while others do not
10
, and yet others have 
procurement processes in place that may well be compliant with the EU rules but do not 
clarify whether the university considers itself obliged to follow them
11
. This seems to 
                                                 
7 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement 
and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC [2014] OJ L 94/65. 
8 For a general overview, see S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU 
and UK, vol 1, 3rd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) 339-383. See also A Semple, A Practical Guide to 
Public Procurement (Oxford, OUP, 2015) 2-3. 
9 For example Durham, Bristol and Sussex. This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but simply a small selection of 
clear cases. See Durham University Procurement Policy, Guide to EU Public Procurement Directive (undated), 
available at https://www.dur.ac.uk/procurement/procurement_policy/8euregulations/ (last accessed September 3, 
2015). University of Bristol, Procurement Policy (August 2015) on file with authors. Slightly outdated, but this is 
also clear in the policy followed by the University of Sussex Procurement Office (undated), available at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/procurement/documentsandpolicies/buyersguideandorderingprocedures/euregulationswhe
ntheybecomeapplicable (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
10 For example Cambridge. See University of Cambridge, Finance Division, Procurement Services, The EU 
Directives on Public Procurement (EU Guide v 3d May 2015), available at 
https://www.admin.cam.ac.uk/offices/purchasing/guides/eu_guide.pdf (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
11 For example Oxford. See University of Oxford, Council Regulations 1 of 2010, Financial Regulations, made by 
Council on 21 June 2010 (Supplement 1 to Gazette, No. 4923, 25 June 2010). Last amended on 10 April 2015 
(Gazette, Vol. 145, pp. 447-449, 26 March 2015), available at http://www.admin.ox.ac.uk/statutes/regulations/101-
078.shtml (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
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derive from legal uncertainty as to the actual scope of coverage of the EU rules—which 
carries on to the domestic Public Contracts Regulations 2015 that transpose them
12
. Of 
course, universities can always decide to comply with the EU public procurement rules 
voluntarily and some of them do
13
. However, from the perspective of legal certainty, it is 
important to clarify when universities are actually under a duty to comply with EU public 
procurement rules. Not only to open up possibilities for alternative procurement practices 
where they are not actually bound by the EU rules, but also to clarify the situation of 
university purchasing consortia that are accumulating more and more purchasing volume
14
, 
and which obligation to comply with EU rules may well be derived from that of the 
universities themselves
15
. Therefore, assessing the actual extent of the obligation to comply 
with EU public procurement rules by universities—either directly or through university 
purchasing consortia—can contribute to increasing legal certainty in this important area of 
public sector expenditure, widely defined. This is the purpose of this section. 
An obligation to comply with the rules in Directive 2014/24 can result from two 
different situations. Firstly, the obligation can derive from the classification of universities 
                                                 
12 The Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/102), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/102/contents/made (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
13 This is the case of the University of Cambridge, maybe as a result of its previous litigation, since it was involved 
in the case that led to the Judgment in University of Cambridge, C-380/98, EU:C:2000:529, which is discussed 
below. 
14 It may be worth noting that there are four regional educational purchasing consortia in England: London; LUPC 
– London Universities Purchasing Consortium (http://www.lupc.ac.uk/); North East; NEUPC – North-eastern 
Universities Purchasing Consortium (http://www.neupc.ac.uk/); North West; NWUPC – North-western 
Universities Purchasing Consortium (http://www.nwupc.ac.uk/); and South; SUPC – Southern Universities 
Purchasing Consortium (http://www.supc.ac.uk/). 
15 This would ensue from Art 2(1)(1) of Directive 2014/24 whereby ‘contracting authorities’ includes associations 
formed by one or more bodies governed by public law. Any eventual primary obligation of such purchasing 
consortia to comply with EU rules is not assessed, as it would exceed the possibilities of this paper. 
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as ‘contracting authorities’ in nature in terms of Article 2(1)(2) of Directive 2014/24, which 
would be the case were universities are formally a State authority
16
. This is an issue left to 
the Member States’ internal organisational autonomy and operates on the basis of a closed 
list that rarely includes universities amongst State authorities.  Thus, this situation will not 
be discussed in any further detail.  
Second, and more crucially, universities can be bound to comply with EU public 
procurement rules due to the origin of their funding. There are two situations that trigger 
coverage by funding, which in turn refer to either structural or sporadic receipt of state 
funds. Structural receipt of state funds can lead to the classification of a university as a 
‘body governed by public law’ under Article 2(1)(4) of Directive 2014/24 where the public 
funds are the major source of university funding (below §2.A). Sporadic receipt of public 
funds also triggers compliance with EU public procurement rules if they cover most of the 
cost of specific contracts involving works for university buildings, or supplies or services 
connected therewith as per Article 13 of Directive 2014/24. However, this is a rather 
residual issue in practice and, in any case, it is not within the core issues affecting 
universities’ general obligation to comply with the EU public procurement rules. Hence, 
this is also not discussed in any further detail. 
The remainder of this section thus explores universities’ coverage by funding as a 
trigger for their obligation to comply with EU public procurement rules as bodies governed 
by public law (below §2.A), putting a special emphasis on the specificities of university 
funding in England, where the Government operates a semi-privatised system of student 
loans that complicates the assessment of the nature of the funds (below §2.B). 
 
                                                 
16 However, this is the case of France, Greece and Sweden, which have designated their universities as central 
government authorities in Annex I of Directive 2014/24. Please note that the Annex is in the original language of 
each of the Member States, which complicates the identification of inclusion of universities named in foreign 
languages that the authors do not know. 
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2.A. Coverage by structural funding: English universities as bodies 
governed by public law. 
As mentioned above, universities can be included in the scope of coverage of 
Directive 2014/24 if they can be classified as ‘bodies governed by public law’. Article 
2(1)(4) of Directive 2014/24 sets out three conditions that need to be met cumulatively for a 
university to match the definition: (a) it must be established for the specific purpose of 
meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character; (b) 
it must have legal personality; and (c) it must be financed, for the most part, by the State, 
regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law; or be subject to 
management supervision by those authorities or bodies; or have an administrative, 
managerial or supervisory board, more than half of whose members are appointed by the 
State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies governed by public law
17
.  
These conditions were discussed explicitly in relation to English universities by 
the CJEU in the University of Cambridge case
18
. There was no doubt that the first two 
conditions were met, and the assessment of the university status as a body governed by 
public law depended on whether it was ‘“financed for the most part” by one or more 
contracting authorities within the meaning of the third indent of that provision’19. In that 
regard, the CJEU stressed that ‘[o]nly payments which go to finance or support the 
activities of the body concerned without any specific consideration therefor may be 
described as “public financing”’20. The CJEU considered that both (i) awards or grants 
                                                 
17 For an analysis of the issue of control over universities, see below §4.B, where the difficulties derived from 
university autonomy regulations are assessed in detail. 
18 University of Cambridge, EU:C:2000:529, in totum. 
19 Ibid, para 19. 
20 Ibid, para 21. 
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paid by one or more contracting authorities for the support of research work and (ii) student 
grants paid by local education authorities to universities in respect of tuition for named 
students constituted ‘public funding’ for these purposes21. The Court also clarified that 
‘financed for the most part’ means ‘more than half’
22
, so that universities need to receive 
more than 50% of their total funding from the State for them to meet this condition. To that 
effect, the CJEU ruled that ‘in order to determine correctly the percentage of public 
financing … account must be taken of all … income, including that which results from a 
commercial activity
23.’ In short, then, if a university receives more than 50% of its total 
income from the State by means of awards or grants related to research and teaching 
activities not paid as consideration for specific research or other services provided to the 
funding authority or authorities, then it is a body governed by public law and bound to 
comply with the rules of Directive 2014/24. 
Thus, the current state of the law would seem to leave limited space for doubt as to 
the classification of English universities as bodies governed by public law, which would 
depend on a relatively straightforward analysis of their financial statements. However, 
cumulative changes in the way in which universities receive funding, particularly for their 
teaching activities, have blurred the legal test initially adopted by the CJEU in University of 
Cambridge. The introduction of a new system of student fees backed up by a semi-
privatised scheme of student loans creates uncertainty as to the origin and nature of the 
tuition fees that English universities now receive from their students. Crucially, the 
introduction of the tuition fees was not part of the analysis in the University of Cambridge 
case because, even if it was decided in 2000, the CJEU only took into account the request 
for a preliminary reference issued in July 1998 by the High Court of Justice of England and 
                                                 
21 Ibid, paras 22-23 and 26. 
22 Ibid, para 33. 
23 Ibid, para 36. 
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Wales, Queen's Bench Division (Divisional Court)
24
. This leaves the reform of English 
university financing in need of a fresh legal assessment. We now turn to the basic elements 
of the current system, and try to reconcile it with the principles for the classification of 
funding as public or private for the purposes of EU public procurement law under the 
University of Cambridge test. 
Tuition fees were first introduced in 1997 to compensate for shortfalls in strictly 
public support for English universities’ teaching activities and were legally enacted by 
means of the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998
25
. The fees started at £1,000 per 
year in academic year 1998-99 and were then trebled in 2006 and again in 2012, to the 
current cap of £9,000
26
. Their overall importance in university funding has thus been 
quantitatively increasing
27
, and English universities depend more and more on this source 
of income
28
. This trend is likely to continue in the future, particularly in view of the current 
                                                 
24 University of Cambridge, EU:C:2000:529, para 1. 
25 SI 1998/30. 
26 For a critical overview, see J Ball, ‘Explained: how is it possible to triple tuition fees and raise no extra cash?’, 
21 March 2014, The Guardian, available at http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/mar/21/explained-
triple-tuition-fees-no-extra-cash (last accessed September 3, 2015).  
27 Interestingly, in 2011-12 (i.e. before the last raise in the applicable cap), undergraduate student fee income 
varied between 0 and 37% of universities’ total income; see Universities UK, Where student fees go, available at 
http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/highereducation/Documents/2013/WhereStudentFeesGo.pdf (last accessed 
September 3, 2015). 
28 This dependence was very clear in the reaction by Universities UK to the Labour proposal to reduce the fee cap 
from £9,000 to £6,000 during the 2015 general election campaign. Universities UK estimated at £10 billion the 
need for additional public support that would result from such a reduction of the fee cap. See ‘Universities UK 
board highlights concerns with £6,000 tuition fees proposal’, 2 February 2015, available at 
http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/highereducation/Pages/UUKboardFeesLetter.aspx#.VehnOflVhBc (last accessed 
September 3, 2015). 
 _____________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Copyleft – Ius Publicum 
13 
plans to lift the cap on fees
29
, at least for universities that ‘can show they offer high-quality 
teaching’30, as well as the suppression of the student number control that existed until 
academic year 2015-16
31
. Thus, tuition fees as a major source of income are likely to grow 
to become quantitatively the largest funding stream for English universities, or at least for 
the largest majority of them, and will in any case remain a key income stream across the 
sector. However, the qualitative nature of this source of funding is changing in a way that 
creates some analytical complications concerning their classification as public or private 
funding. 
Tuition fees are formally paid by students and could be considered a source of 
private funding or income for universities. However, the UK Government has created a 
semi-privatised system of student loans which makes the assessment not so 
straightforward
32
. The Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS)—together with 
                                                 
29 Although there is some uncertainty about this. See F Perraudin, ‘Universities minister doesn’t rule out raising 
tuition fees’, 30 June 2015, The Guardian, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/jun/30/universities-minister-doesnt-rule-out-raising-tuition-fees (last 
accessed September 3, 2015). 
30 J Morgan, ‘Budget 2015: fees can rise for universities with “high-quality teaching”’, 8 July 2015, Times Higher 
Education, available at https://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/news/osborne-signals-rise-9k-fee-cap-tef (last 
accessed September 3, 2015). 
31 See N Hillman, A Guide to the Removal of Student Number Controls (2014) Higher Education Policy Institute 
Report 69, available at http://www.hepi.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Clean-copy-of-SNC-paper.pdf (last 
accessed September 3, 2015). 
32 There were plans for its full privatisation, but these seem to have been abandoned. See A Chakrabortty, ‘Student 
loans: not even Cameron could privatise the unprivatisable’, 22 July 2014, The Guardian, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/22/student-loans-cameron-privatise-sale (last accessed 
September 3, 2015). However, rumours of reinvigorated attempts to at least sell part of the loan portfolio are 
recurring; O Williams-Grut, ‘The Tories are resurrecting plans to privatise a big chunk of Britain's student loans’, 
21 May 2015, Business Insider UK, available at http://uk.businessinsider.com/chancellor-george-osborne-to-sell-
off-1998-2012-student-loan-book-now-vince-cable-gone-2015-5 (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
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the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Assembly Government and the Department for 
Employment and Learning in Northern Ireland—owns The Student Loans Company (SLC) 
33
, which adopts the form of an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body (NDPB)
34
, is 
entirely Government-funded
35
 and not-for-profit, and the appointment of the members of its 
Board are made by the shareholders directly (ie by the BIS and other State authorities). So 
there is no doubt that it constitutes a body governed by public law (see discussion above). 
Its creation as a NDPB is meant to allow for its operation as a ‘body which has a role in the 
processes of national government, but is not a government department or part of one, and 
which accordingly operates to a greater or lesser extent at arm’s length from ministers’36. 
Moreover, its executive status means that, amongst other things, the SLC is able to make 
decisions in an autonomous way, enter into contracts and own assets and dispose of them
37
. 
Therefore, the SLC is a body governed by public law that manages public funds in a rather 
independent fashion in terms of specific decisions whether to lend or not money to specific 
applicants. However, it also has very limited autonomy in the way it adopts its non-
                                                 
33 http://www.slc.co.uk/about-us/remit.aspx (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
34 For background, see https://www.gov.uk/guidance/public-bodies-reform (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
35 It received £154 million in 2013-14; see Cabinet Office, ‘Public bodies 2014: data directory’, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/387313/Annex_B_-
_Public_bodies_2014_Data_Directory_PDF.pdf (last accessed September 3, 2015). However, the SLC pays £5.9 
billion to higher and further education providers yearly and manages a loan book with a value of £62 billion; 
Student Loans Company, Corporate and Business Plan FY14-15 to FY16-17 (2015) 5, available at 
http://www.slc.co.uk/media/3435/corporate_and_business_plan_fy14-15.pdf (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
36 Cabinet Office, Public Bodies: A Guide for Departments, 2006, available at http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/2_policy_Characteristics-word_tcm6-3410.doc (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
37 M Treasury, Classification of Expenditure Public and Private Sectors: New Bodies, Partnerships, Joint 
Ventures, Privatisation and Nationalisation, November 2000, available at 
http://www.wga.gov.uk/pages/classification.html (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
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commercial decisions (see below §2.B for further details)
38
. The fact that the SLC pays 
tuition fees directly to universities on behalf of students complicates the simple assessment 
that such fees are paid by the students. This is a key issue for the purposes of our 
discussion because classifying tuition fees as private income for universities would 
potentially bring public funding below the 50% threshold that triggers the obligation to 
comply with the EU public procurement rules. Thus, a detailed analysis is carried out in the 
following subsection. 
 
2.B. Key issue: are student fees financed through student loans state 
resources? 
The previous discussion stressed how the CJEU interprets “public funding” as 
inclusive of student grants paid by local education authorities to universities in respect of 
tuition for named students
39
. The question is whether the same reasoning applies to tuition 
fees paid directly by the SLC to universities on behalf of named students. A quick answer 
could be that it simply does
40
. However, determining the nature of this source of university 
income may be complicated if we take into account that the university sets its tuition fee 
level regardless of the actual student’s access to finance. That is, the university expects the 
same fee regardless of the student opting to pay for it directly or with an SLC loan, or any 
other financial facility. Moreover, lack of payment by the SLC to the university would not 
                                                 
38 The criteria for such decisions are, indeed, set by the Government. See Cabinet Office, Student Finance, 
available at https://www.gov.uk/student-finance (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
39 University of Cambridge, EU:C:2000:529, paras 23 and 26. 
40 Clearly supporting this position, see Beresford-Jones (n 3), who stressed that ‘the increasing sum being paid 
through tuition fees funded via the SLC is unlikely to assist universities to wriggle free of the public procurement 
regime’. 
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necessarily exempt the student from having to pay the tuition fees, or else see its 
registration terminated—although universities have implemented temporary loan schemes 
to try to avoid this. Consequently, the main ‘funding’ relationship is that between each 
student and the university it chooses to enrol in, and the SLC could be seen as a ‘mere’ 
intermediary or an agent for the student. The fact that the student has at least a residual 
obligation to pay the tuition fee to the university may have changed the nature of the 
funding received by English universities. Thus, this issue seems to merit some closer 
scrutiny. 
EU public procurement rules and the interpreting case law of the CJEU have not 
developed the criteria to distinguish between private and public funding any further than in 
University of Cambridge. However, functionally equivalent criteria are clearly developed in 
the neighbouring area of EU State aid law, where the imputability of an aid measure to the 
State—or, in simpler terms, the existence of ‘public funding’ lato sensu—is a key 
jurisdictional requirement to apply the prohibition in Article 107(1) TFEU
41
. We submit 
that the same criteria can be used for the analysis of the private or public nature of the 
tuition fees paid by the SLC directly to English universities. 
In that regard, it is interesting to stress that the CJEU has been developing a 
growing body of case law concerned with the assessment of the public or private nature of 
the funds managed by arm’s length entities and not-for-profit associations. There are two 
2013 cases particularly relevant for our discussion, which set conditions and requirements 
at two different levels. At a general level, the CJEU has clarified that the key element to 
determine whether specific funds are ‘public’ or, technically, ‘State resources’ is to focus 
on the control over those funds
42
. Indeed, 
                                                 
41 See the Draft Commission Notice on the notion of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2014_state_aid_notion/draft_guidance_en.pdf (last accessed 
September 3, 2015). 
42 Judgment of 19 December 2013 in Vent De Colère and Others, C-262/12, EU:C:2013:851. 
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The concept of ‘intervention through State resources’ is intended to cover, in addition to 
advantages granted directly by the State, those granted through a public or private body 
appointed or established by that State to administer the aid ... 
even if the sums corresponding to the measure in question are not permanently held by the 
Treasury, the fact that they constantly remain under public control, and therefore available 
to the competent national authorities, is sufficient for them to be categorised as State 
resources
43
. 
In that regard, the fact that BIS controls the SLC and could at any point in time 
reduce or even withdraw the grant aid support it provides for its subsequent payment to 
higher education institutions
44
 is a very strong indication that the creation of such arm’s 
length entity does not suffice to ‘privatise’ the funds made available to universities through 
the direct payment of the corresponding tuition fees by SLC on behalf of the students. 
Indeed, the difficult issue regarding State control of the funds in this setting derives from 
the direct payment SLC makes to universities because students are never in possession or 
control of the funds, so there is no risk that students will dedicate their loans to anything 
different than paying the tuition fees (and this is, most likely, the precise goal of the direct 
payment mechanism). If the loans were paid to students and they then paid the fees on to 
the university, given that the State would have lost control of the use of the funds, this 
could change the analysis. Of course, if students were contractually obliged to use the funds 
exclusively to pay the tuition fees and that was effectively monitored, the situation would 
be in a grey area and a discussion on the intensity of that control could ensue. However, 
under the current design of the SLC loans and for so long as the SLC pays tuition fees to 
                                                 
43 Ibid, paras 20-21, references omitted. 
44 This has been the case of further education; L Okolosie. ‘Adult education is being slashed and burned – this is 
too important to ignore’, 26 March 215, The Guardian, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/26/adult-education-funding-cuts (last accessed September 
3, 2015). 
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universities directly and on behalf of the students, there seems to be little scope to challenge 
that those funds remain under public control at all times. 
It is also important to stress that, in determining whether the funds actually 
managed by the arm’s length entity are available to the competent national authorities, the 
CJEU has paid particular attention to whether the decisions are adopted independently from 
Government or not. The Court found that such was not the case where the ‘organisation … 
decides how to use those resources, which are entirely dedicated to pursuing objectives 
determined by that organisation’45. As mentioned above, the SLC actually has very limited 
discretion concerning the use of the resources made available to it, particularly because the 
conditions for the entitlement to a student loan—and especially a tuition fee loan—are 
predetermined by the Government. Thus, public control of the funds made available to SLC 
operates at two levels: firstly, in terms of the total volume of funding made available (or 
not) to SLC and, secondly, in terms of the conditions in which that funding can be used to 
provide student financial support. 
Further, at a more specific level, the CJEU has also clarified that there has to be a 
minimum exercise of ‘State prerogatives’ by the arm’s length institution for the funding it 
manages to remain ‘public’. Or, a contrario, that the possibility of exercising ‘State 
prerogatives’ taints the funding with a clear public shade. Indeed, in considering that a 
specific intervention did not constitute public funding, the Court stressed that 
That mechanism does not involve any direct or indirect transfer of State resources, the 
sums provided … do not go through the State budget or through another public body and 
the State does not relinquish any resources, in whatever form (such as taxes, duties, 
charges and so on), which, under national legislation, should have been paid into the State 
budget. The contributions remain private in nature throughout their lifecycle and, in order 
                                                 
45 Judgment in Doux Élevages and Coopérative agricole UKL-AREE, C-677/11, EU:C:2013:348, para 37. 
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to collect those contributions in the event of non-payment, the … organisation must follow 
the normal civil or commercial judicial process, not having any State prerogatives
46
. 
This is not the case of the SLC, particularly when it comes to the recovery of the 
student loans. The SLC has the possibility of benefitting from the State prerogatives linked 
to the collection of taxes and, as a matter of general design, student loans are repaid through 
salary withholdings by employers
47
. Regardless of the poor practical results of this 
strategy
48
, it is clearly not an inter privatos or commercial mechanism. Moreover, student 
loans are subjected to a final age-based write-off
49
, and other types of condonation 
conditions that are resulting in a large volume never being repaid
50
, which is yet another 
clear indication of the public nature of the funds because the consequences of such write-
offs and any other failure to recover the loans ultimately hits the public purse
51
, and not the 
universities’ balance sheets. 
                                                 
46 Ibid, para 32. 
47 See HM Revenue & Customs, An Employer’s Guide to the Collection of Student Loans (2014), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/276347/E17_2014_.pdf (last 
accessed September 3, 2015). 
48 R L Cosslett, ‘No wonder people aren't paying back their student loans’, 28 November 2013, The Guardian, 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/28/paying-back-student-loans (last accessed September 3, 
2015). 
49 http://www.slc.co.uk/services/loan-repayment/loan-cancellation.aspx (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
50 S Mali, ‘Student fees policy likely to cost more than the system it replaced’, 21 March 2014, The Guardian, 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/mar/21/student-fees-policy-costing-more (last accessed 
September 3, 2015). 
51 R Syal, ‘Up to 40% of new student loans may never be repaid’, 11 December 2013, The Guardian, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2013/dec/11/student-loans-may-never-be-repaid (last accessed September 
3, 2015). R Garner, ‘Tuition fees: Three quarters of students won’t be able to pay off their debt’, 18 November 
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For all these reasons, it seems clear that the changes introduced in the way English 
universities receive funds for their teaching activities has not qualitatively changed in a way 
capable of eroding their condition of “public funding” for the purposes of their inclusion in 
the scope of coverage of the EU public procurement rules as bodies governed by public law 
under the University of Cambridge test.  
Incidentally, thus, this source of funding should also be considered public funding 
when the recipients are not traditional universities, but alternative and private providers of 
higher education services, which now benefit from the scheme of student loans
52
. In these 
cases, then, the status quo could change if the percentage of fees paid through SLC-backed 
student loans exceeds 50% of their total revenue, in which case the rest of the conditions for 
their classification as bodies governed by public law would require reassessing (above). 
The key point in that case would be to determine whether commercial and alternative 
providers funded in more than 50% through student loans as described above could be 
considered to have been established ‘for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the 
general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character’. This seems highly 
unlikely for commercial providers, but cannot be automatically discarded for other 
alternative providers of higher education. If the situation arose where non-commercial 
alternative providers funded in more than 50% by student loans could operate without 
complying with procurement rules while ‘traditional’ universities are bound by those rules, 
                                                                                                                            
2014, The Independent, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/higher/tuition-fees-three-
quarters-of-students-wont-be-able-to-pay-off-their-debt-9866446.html (last accessed September 3, 2015). 
52 See ‘Watchdog called in on private college use of student loans’, 22 May 2014, Times Higher Education, 
available at https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/watchdog-called-in-on-private-college-use-of-student-
loans/2013526.article, and the ensuing National Audit Office, Investigation into financial support for students at 
alternative higher education providers, HC 861 Session 2014-15, 2 December 2014, available at 
http://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Investigation-into-financial-support-for-students-at-
alternative-higher-education-providers.pdf (both last accessed October 5, 2015). See also C Cook, ‘Huge growth 
in private students taking state loans’, 26 January 2015, BBC News, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
politics-30988416 (last accessed October 5, 2015).  
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a difficult issue of level playing field could arise. In those circumstances, the creation of an 
‘exposure to market competition’ exception to compliance with public procurement rules 
could be desirable—as has been always recognised under the utilities procurement 
regime
53
. However, these considerations exceed the possibilities of this paper and will, 
consequently, not be explored any further. 
 
2.C. Preliminary conclusion 
The discussion in the first part of this paper has shown how English universities 
are very unlikely to free themselves from the obligation to comply with EU public 
procurement rules as buyers, even if their dependence on student loan-backed tuition fees 
continues to increase in the future and becomes the largest source of income for these 
higher education institutions. Only a significant reform of the way in which the SLC is 
controlled and funded, or in the way in which loans are paid out, would alter this situation, 
which at present seems unlikely. Consequently, for as long as the main source of revenue 
continues to originate—directly or indirectly—in the general budget, English universities 
will remain bound to comply with these rules. This case study could be useful in other EU 
Member States currently considering a reform of the way in which their universities and 
higher education institutions are funded and, generally, seems to indicate that universities 
will structurally remain within the scope of coverage of the EU public procurement rules 
unless they become institutions with major commercial or private revenue streams. If 
universities’ activities were to be classified as themselves having to be procured from them 
by the state, this would constitute such a commercial revenue stream. In how far this could 
be the case will be the topic of the next section. 
                                                 
53 Article 34 of 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement 
by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC 
[2014] OJ L94/243. 
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3. UNIVERSITIES AS PROVIDERS 
 
In this second part of the paper we will explore the position of universities as 
providers of public services, broadly defined. First, continuing with the case study of 
universities in England, we will assess in which cases public procurement needs to take 
place when universities provide public services to the State (§3.A) in the form of tuition of 
higher education students or research services. Regarding higher education tuition in 
England, it is worth stressing that, despite the fact that students pay tuition fees (most of 
them indirectly, through SLC-backed student loans, see above §2.B), the State directly 
tops-up university funds by means of teaching-related funding that is made available to 
universities through grants of the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE)
54
. Thus, there is a first question to be addressed in determining whether the 
granting of such funding to universities is in strict consideration for those educational 
services, which should thus require a tendering exercise under the EU public procurement 
rules. Or, in other words, it requires clarifying whether the State (through HEFCE) enters 
into public contracts for the provision of higher education services with the universities in 
such a way as to trigger compliance with the EU public procurement rules or not (§3.A.I). 
A similar issue arises concerning the general funding that HEFCE makes available for 
‘quality-related research’ developed by English universities, in particular under the 
Research Excellence Framework (REF)
55
. Such general (public) research services will be 
distinguished from the provision of commercial or economic research services to the public 
sector, which will trigger different public procurement treatment (§3.A.II). Given that 
                                                 
54 HEFCE, How teaching is funded, available at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/lt/howfund/ (last accessed October 15, 
2015). 
55 HEFCE, How we fund research, available at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/rsrch/funding/ (last accessed October 15, 
2015). 
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procurement rules will not always be applicable or, where applicable, will not necessarily 
exclude the granting of an economic advantage to English universities, the analysis in this 
part of the paper will also extend to the assessment of the funding linked to the provision of 
education and some research-related services from a State aid perspective (§3.B). 
 
3.A. When does public procurement need to take place?   
It is worth highlighting from the outset that ‘there is a basic tension between the 
freedom of Member States to identify public services and designate undertakings as 
responsible for carrying out public service obligations and requirements that in doing so 
they must respect the public procurement rules’56. This tension is reflected in the question 
‘when do public procurement rules apply to the commissioning of services provided by 
universities?’, which is not easy to answer. 
Directive 2014/24 applies only to public contracts
57
. Public contracts are defined 
by Article 2(1)(5) of Directive 2014/24 as ‘contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in 
writing between one or more economic operators and one or more contracting authorities 
and having as their object the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of 
services’. As an important requirement under the definition, the commissioning body needs 
to be a contracting authority. Unlike the scenarios discussed above where the universities 
are the buyers (§2), it is clear that when they are the providers of educational and research 
services, the State as the buyer is a contracting authority (Article 2(1)(1)). There is no 
                                                 
56 W Sauter, Public Services in EU Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2015) 163.  
57 Or, in terms of its Article 1(1) it establishes rules on the procedures for procurement by contracting authorities 
with respect to public contracts. 
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question either that, if they are providing economic teaching and research services
58
, 
universities can qualify as economic operators under the definition in Article 2(1)(10) of 
Directive 2014/24, whereby an economic operator is an entity offering goods, services or 
supplies on a market. As stressed in Recital 14 of the same Directive: 
‘It should be clarified that the notion of ‘economic operators’ should be interpreted in a 
broad manner so as to include any persons and/or entities which offer the execution of 
works, the supply of products or the provision of services on the market, irrespective of the 
legal form under which they have chosen to operate. Thus, firms, […], universities, public 
or private, and other forms of entities than natural persons should all fall within the notion 
of economic operator, whether or not they are ‘legal persons’ in all circumstances.’ 59 
It is also clear that the definition of public contracts does not require providers to 
make a profit, and that a pecuniary interest for the purposes of the definition under Article 
2(1)(5) can amount to the reimbursement of costs
60
. Thus, the existence of a written 
contract (or a ‘contract concluded in writing’) becomes the key issue in the assessment of 
whether the funding made available by HEFCE to English universities fits the definition of 
a public contract so that the commissioning of services to universities is covered by the EU 
public procurement rules
61
. Given that Member States have the possibility to mandate and 
                                                 
58 This is related to the question whether or not an economic activity is taking place to which we will get back to 
below at the end of this section.  
59 Emphasis added.  
60 Judgment of 19 December 2012 in Ordine degli Ingegneri della Provincia di Lecce, C-159/11, EU:C:2012:817, 
para 29. See further Arrowsmith (n 8) 394-397, and Semple (n 8) para 1.03 
61 We will discuss this here for generic funding provided by HEFCE for teaching and research as the most unclear 
area of public funding provision. In other areas of research funding (e.g. through the research councils or 
government departments) the existence of some form of written contract can generally be assumed which makes 
this criterion more clear cut. 
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support the provision of this type of services without entering into written contracts, for 
instance, by simply creating regulatory regimes that achieve the same result, this is a point 
that deserves careful consideration. Indeed, as Recital 114 of Directive 2014/24 states  
Member States and public authorities remain free to […] organise social services in a way 
that does not entail the conclusion of public contracts, for example through the mere 
financing of such services or by granting licences or authorisations to all economic 
operators meeting the conditions established beforehand by the contracting authority, 
without any limits or quotas, provided that such a system ensures sufficient advertising and 
complies with the principles of transparency and non-discrimination. 
Thus, where the provision of such social services
62
 does not rely on a contract-
based method of delivery and management, public procurement rules will not apply. 
Ultimately, then, it is necessary to determine whether HEFCE’s financial support entails the 
‘mere financing of such services’ and is therefore not covered by the procurement rules or, 
conversely, it takes place within the framework of a public contract and, by implication, 
                                                 
62 We use the expression ‘social services’ in a broad way, to refer both to social services of general interest (SSGI) 
and services of general economic interest (SGEI), so as to cover all possibilities. Strictly speaking, procurement 
rules will generally not apply to SSGI that are non-economic in nature because some of the conditions in the 
definition of public contract will not be met. Moreover, distinguishing whether an activity is an SSGI or an SGEI 
will sometimes require assessments that already involve a consideration of how the services are commissioned, 
which could render some tests circular. Furthermore, as discussed below (n 75), Directive 2014/24 uses all these 
terms in a rather confusing manner without that resulting in a different legal regime as far as procurement rules 
and requirements are concerned. Thus, for our purposes, social services is an all-encompassing category, and it 
explicitly covers higher education, despite the fact that Directive 2014/24 sometimes uses the expression special 
services to refer to education. Generally, on these conceptual complications, see U Neergaard, ‘The Concept of 
SSGIs and the Asymmetries between Free Movement and Competition Law’, in U Neergaard et al (eds), Social 
Services of General Interest in the EU (The Hague, TMC Asser, 2013); U Neergaard, ‘Services of general 
economic interest: the nature of the beast’, in M Krajewski, U Neergaard and J van de Gronden (eds), The 
Changing Legal Framework for Services of General Economic Interest (The Hague, TMC Asser, 2009); and GS 
Ølykke and P Møllgaard, ‘What is a service of general economic interest?’ (2013) European Journal of Law and 
Economics 1-37. 
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needs to be subjected to such rules. As we discuss in this section, answering this question is 
not straightforward, particularly when services are provided under complex regulatory 
schemes such as the funding system in place for English higher education institutions. 
In the recent Libert Judgment
63
, the CJEU offered some guidance as to the 
interpretation of the written contract requirement in scenarios where the provision of the 
public service does not necessarily derive from a unique and complete single written 
contract between the contracting authority and the supplier, but from an interplay of 
contractual and regulatory obligations
64
. The dispute concerned the obligation to submit the 
development of social housing to public procurement. The Belgian State had not been 
tendering contracts for social housing because the obligation to market a specified 
proportion of homes through social housing organisations in advantageous terms to 
predefined social groups was created by a general law. The question was whether the 
inexistence of a single direct contractual relationship between the developers and the 
Belgian authorities excluded compliance with EU procurement rules. The CJEU found that 
these circumstances did not preclude the possibility of the existence of a contract between 
the authorities and the developer in question for the purposes of the application of the 
procurement rules. However, the CJEU did hint that for such contract to exist, it had to 
‘regulate the relationship between the contracting authority and the economic operator 
concerned […  and] the development of social housing units [rather than] the next stage 
which entails placing them on the market’. The determination of ‘whether the development 
of social housing units [… was] within the framework of a contractual relationship between 
a contracting authority and an economic operator’ was left to the domestic court65.  
                                                 
63 Judgment of 8 May 2013 in Libert and Others, C-197/11, EU:C:2013:288. 
64 The latter was also partially discussed in the Judgment of in Asociación Nacional de Empresas Forestales 
(Asemfo), C-295/05, EU:C:2007:227, where the CJEU took into consideration that the non-commercial terms of 
the acts of entrustment to the in-house entity were determined by law. For analysis, see Arrowsmith (n 8) 391-392. 
65 See Libert, C-197/11, EU:C:2013:288, at paras 112 to 115. 
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Mutatis mutandi, we submit that determining whether the provision of the (public) 
services of higher education and university research is subjected to the EU public 
procurement rules depends on the assessment of whether such activities take place ‘within 
the framework of a contractual relationship’ between HEFCE and each of the English 
universities it funds. This will be particularly relevant because the absence of a contractual 
relationship—understood as one where the funding is provided in exchange or in 
consideration for the provision of specific services under predetermined conditions—would 
exclude HEFCE’s grants from any tendering obligation whatsoever. Thus, assessing to 
what extent the funding is tied to specific conditions that make the relationship acquire a 
‘contractual nature’ is crucial for our purposes. 
In this regard, it is important to stress that the funding HEFCE provides is 
instrumented through ‘funding agreements’, which HEFCE itself defines in the following 
terms: 
The annual funding agreement between HEFCE and the institutions it funds sets out the 
recurrent grant allocated for the year, the circumstances under which that grant may be 
adjusted, and particular terms and conditions associated with it. These include, for 
example, any requirements relating to student numbers and to comply with regulated 
tuition fee limits and access agreements. For publicly funded higher education institutions, 
the funding agreement is part two of the Memorandum of Assurance and Accountability
66
. 
Such a Memorandum of Assurance and Accountability between HEFCE and 
Institutions is subtitled ‘Terms and conditions for payment of HEFCE grants to higher 
education institutions’ and, in our view, could be regarded as the basis of the contractual 
relationship between HEFCE and the publicly funded higher education institutions because, 
as the document itself clarifies: 
                                                 
66 HEFCE, Glossary, available at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/glossary/#letterF (last accessed October 15, 2015). 
Emphasis added. 
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The memorandum of assurance and accountability between HEFCE and the institutions we 
fund sets out the terms and conditions for payment of HEFCE grants. This memorandum 
should be read in conjunction with the ‘funding agreement’ for each institution, which 
gives specific conditions, funds available and educational provision agreed in return for 
those funds
67
. 
Assessing the content of such ‘specific conditions’ is quite difficult because they 
are not public. However, in its general guidance, HEFCE indicates that 
Terms and conditions set out in the funding agreement include, for example, requirements 
to: make certain data returns, including those that inform our allocations or that are used 
for public information purposes, such as the KIS; comply with regulated tuition fee limits 
and any access agreement with the Office for Fair Access; provide or update a strategic 
statement about widening participation and make annual monitoring returns; comply with 
the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) UK Quality Code for Higher 
Education as it relates to postgraduate research programmes
68
. 
Generally, then, it is quite clear that funding is not unconditional and that it is 
closely linked to the provision of specific volumes of services (at least as teaching is 
concerned) and compliance with specific qualitative controls of the services provided. It 
should be acknowledged that HEFCE leaves significant leeway to individual institutions to 
decide how to use the funds they receive
69
. However, in our view, that does not erode the 
                                                 
67 HEFCE, Memorandum of Assurance and Accountability between HEFCE and Institutions. The document is 
fully accessible at http://www.hefce.ac.uk/media/hefce/content/pubs/2014/201412/HEFCE2014_12.pdf (last 
accessed October 15, 2015). 
68 HEFCE, Guide to funding 2015-16. How HEFCE allocates its funds, para 181, available at 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/media/HEFCE,2014/Content/Pubs/2015/201504/2015_04.pdf (last accessed October 15, 
2015). 
69 See HEFCE, Guide to funding 2015-16 (n 68) para 17: ‘Institutions receive most of their teaching, research and 
knowledge exchange funding as a grant that they are free to spend according to their own priorities, within our 
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general contractual nature of the relationship and the strong link between the volume of 
funding and that of the services provided by each institution
70
. Thus, the existence of 
specific conditions and monitoring mechanisms point clearly to the existence of a 
‘framework of a contractual relationship’ between HEFCE and the universities it funds. 
Thus, it seems to us that, from this perspective, the EU public procurement rules are 
generally applicable to the commissioning of teaching and research (public) services by 
HEFCE to English universities by means of the annual grants it provides to complement the 
funding universities receive from students via fees (above §2) and other sources of 
commercial revenue.  
However, also at a general level and related to the question whether an entity is an 
economic operator, it is worth stressing that public procurement rules only apply to 
‘economic activities’ (Recital 6 of Directive 2014/24). Therefore, another issue requiring 
clarification before definitely concluding whether HEFCE commissioning should comply 
with EU public procurement rules is to determine if the activities conducted by universities 
are of an economic nature or not. We will discuss this further below, separately for teaching 
(§3.A.I) and research (§3.A.II). Finally, there are quantitative value thresholds under which 
the Directive does not apply. As the thresholds differ for different activities these will 
equally be discussed separately below (§3.A.I for teaching and §3.A.II research). 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
broad guidelines. We do not expect them, as autonomous bodies that set their own strategic priorities, to model 
their internal allocations on our calculations. However, certain conditions are attached to funding and are 
specified in institutions’ funding agreements with us’. 
70 See HEFCE, Guide to funding 2015-16 (n 68) para 36: ‘… we fund the activities of institutions. However, we do 
count students in our funding methods, as a proxy measure for the level of teaching and research activities taking 
place at institutions.’ 
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3.A.I. Teaching activities 
As mentioned above, the most important remaining question is whether the 
provision of higher education services constitutes an economic activity, i.e. if English 
universities are offering those services in a market. While the European Commission, with 
reference to the CJEU’s case law in the area of the free movement of services71, has 
traditionally regarded higher education as non-economic in nature, it has also more recently 
established that ‘in certain Member States public institutions can also offer educational 
services which, due to their nature, financing structure and the existence of competing 
private organisations, are to be regarded as economic’72. Whether this is the case for 
higher education has to be decided on a case by case basis taking into account the political 
choices of the Member State
73
. In England, where private operators are increasingly 
competing with publicly-funded ones and the whole set of recent reforms was aimed at 
creating a market place
74
, the question of whether or not an economic activity is taking 
place triggers an interesting discussion. In such a system one might consider higher 
education as an economic service for which the institutions get paid partly through tuition 
fees (which are mostly financed through public loans, see discussion above §2) and partly 
through the reimbursement of costs by the state by means of the block grants HEFCE 
makes available to universities. If we thus conclude that universities in England are 
                                                 
71 Judgment of 27 September 1988 in Belgian State v Humbel and Edel, C-263/86, EU:C:1988:451, para 14 seq, 
and Judgment of 7 December 1993 in Wirth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover, C-109/92, EU:C:1993:916, para 13 
seq. 
72 Commission Communication on the application of the European Union State aid rules to compensation granted 
for the provision of services of general economic interest OJ [2012] C 8/02 paragraph 28. 
73 See further A Gideon, ‘Higher Education Institutions and EU Competition Law’ (2012) 8 Competition Law 
Review 169 and A Gideon, ‘The Position of Higher Education Institutions in a Changing European Context: An 
EU Law Perspective’ (2015) 53 JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 1045.  
74 BIS, HIGHER EDUCATION - Students at the Heart of the System (The Stationary Office 2011).  
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economic operators providing public services of an economic nature (i.e. SGEIs) for which 
they are partly reimbursed by the state through HEFCE grants, then public procurement 
rules (should) apply to the commissioning of those services to English universities by the 
State through HEFCE—and, conversely, the direct award of that funding without 
competitive mechanisms could amount to the award of State aid (as discussed below §3.B). 
However, the rules in Directive 2014/24 do not apply in their entirety to the 
commissioning of this type of services, as public service contracts for certain services listed 
in Annex XIV
75
, which mentions inter alia ‘administrative social, educational, healthcare 
and cultural services’76 fall under a light touch regime which enables a more social 
approach in this area
77
. Title III Chapter I of Directive 2014/24 sets out the particular 
procurement regime for these services. According to Recital 114, the reasoning behind this 
alternative, softer regime is that the level of competition that can be expected for these 
services is rather limited, at least from a ‘cross-border dimension’, because such ‘services 
are provided within a particular context that varies widely amongst Member States, due to 
different cultural traditions’. The light touch regime applies to contracts above a specific 
value (€750,000) that we assume to always be exceeded by the level of the grants provided 
by HEFCE
78
, and mainly requires announcement of intention to award a contract and 
                                                 
75 As mentioned above (n 62), this is an example where education is named separately from social services; both in 
the heading of the relevant subsection of Directive 2014/24 (as ‘social and other specific services’) and in the body 
of the Annex (as ‘administrative social, education, healthcare and cultural services’). However, given that the 
applicable legal regime is the same (i.e. light touch), for the purposes of our discussion, there is no need to use the 
expression ‘social services’ with any further degree of precision. 
76 More specifically, the Annex includes higher education services (CPV code 80300000-7). 
77 Semple (n 8) para 1.37. 
78 According to Article 4(d) of Directive 2014/24 the value threshold is of €750,000, which is to be equated to 
£625,050 as per Communication of 14 December 2013 on corresponding values of the thresholds of Directives 
2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council [2013] OJ C366/1. This 
instrument is still in force despite referring to the previous generation of EU Directives. 
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publication of results (Article 75). Otherwise Member States are free to set the specific 
rules for the award of these contracts as long as they guarantee fairness and transparency 
and take into account the specificities of the service and other aspects such as accessibility 
and needs of certain users, etc. (Article 76). They can also reserve certain services to certain 
participatory third sector organisations (Article 77). When applying the light touch regime, 
Member States are also prescribed to take Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 into 
consideration as well as the ‘rules applicable to service contracts not subject to the specific 
regime’ (recital 114).  
It is worth stressing that even if, contrary to our assessment above, the 
arrangements between HEFCE and the universities were not to be regarded as public 
contracts, the general Treaty principles of transparency and equal treatment reflected in the 
Directive still apply to the assignment of special and exclusive rights, such as licences and 
authorisations to engage in certain regulated economic activities
79
, at least if there is a 
potential cross-border interest
80
. The only situation that could completely escape the 
application of the general principles would be the provision of non-economic services
81
. As 
discussed earlier in this section, this is unlikely to cover higher education services where 
                                                                                                                            
One can safely assume that the amount of reimbursement costs for publicly funded higher education services 
exceeds the mentioned threshold. For academic year 2015-16, HEFCE granted £1,418 million in teaching-related 
funding and only 130 universities were funded; see HEFCE, Guide to funding 2015-16 (n 68) para 67. 
79 Indeed, the CJEU has also requiring compliance with these principles when no public contract is involved, such 
as in the case of authorisations; see GS Ølykke, ‘Is the granting of special and exclusive rights subject to the 
principles applicable to the award of concessions? Recent developments in case law and their implications for one 
of the last sanctuaries for protectionism’ (2014) 23(1) Public Procurement Law Review 1-20. 
80 A Sanchez-Graells, 'Competition and State Aid Implications of the Spezzino Judgment (C-113/13): The Scope 
for Inconsistency in Assessing Support for Public Services Voluntary Organisations' (2015) June SSRN p. 5, 
Semple (n 8) para 1.74 seq, Sauter (n 56) p. 166 seq. 
81 Article 2 of Protocol No 26 TFEU. 
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the provision is based on competitive market-like mechanisms. The application of the 
Treaty principles can complicate certain aspects of the organisation of those arrangements, 
such as the imposition of an absolute exclusion of non-English universities—which would 
need to be assessed under the rules applicable to State aid and, in particular to State aid for 
SGEIs (as discussed below §3.B). Thus, the only way to try to avoid compliance with the 
soft touch regime of EU public procurement rules and the general Treaty principles entirely 
would be to articulate them as non-economic services. In the case of England, this does not 
seem plausible, as it would require undoing a very significant number of market-oriented 
reforms of the higher education sector. Having said that, despite a partly bold approach in 
earlier case law favouring the Treaty rules on free movement
82
, more recent cases such as 
Spezzino
83
, but also Dirextra or Sarc
84
, seem to indicate a certain reluctance by the CJEU to 
get too involved in policy decisions in areas where the main responsibility rests with the 
Member States. Therefore, this could create more scope of non-subjection of (non-
contractualised) higher education models to general EU law requirements. This will be 
                                                 
82 Most significantly perhaps in the area of education, Judgment of 7 July 2005 in Commission vs Austria, C-
147/03, EU:C:2005:427; and Judgment of 1 July 2004 in Commission vs Belgium, C-65/03, EU:C:2004:402 where 
the Court significantly altered national university access policies. But see also Judgment of 23 October 2007 in 
Morgan and Bucher, joined cases C-11/06 and 12/06, EU:C:2007:626; Judgment of 18 July 2013 in Prinz and 
Seeberger, joined cases C-523/11 and C-585/11, EU:C:2013:524; Judgment of 24 October 2013 in Thiele 
Meneses, C-220/12, EU:C:2013:683; Judgment of 24 October 2013 in Elrick, C-275/12, EU:C:2013:684, and, 
recently, Judgment of 26 February 2015 in Martens, C-359/13, EU:C:2015:118 on the extension of portability of 
study grants. Or Judgment of 11 September 2007 in Schwarz and Gootjes - Schwarz, C-76/05, EU:C:2007:492; 
Judgment of 18 December 2007 in Jundt, C-281/06, EU:C:2007:816; and Judgment of 20 May 2010 in Zanotti, C-
56/09, EU:C:2010:288 on changes in tax deductibility. 
83 Judgment of 11 December 2014 in Azienda sanitaria locale n. 5 «Spezzino» and Others, C-113/13, 
EU:C:2014:2440.  
84 Judgment of 12 December 2013 in Dirextra Alta Formazione, C-523/12, EU:C:2013:831 ; and Judgment of the 
General Court of 12 June 2014 in Sarc v Commission, T-488/11, EU:T:2014:497. Yet in these cases there was a 
certain overlap with policy aims followed at the EU level itself. 
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discussed further below (§3.B). For a definite conclusion a judgment by the Court might 
have to be awaited. 
 
3.A.II. Research activities 
Once again, the most important remaining step in our analysis requires to evaluate 
whether the carrying out of research activities by universities constitutes an economic 
activity for the purposes of their subjection to EU public procurement rules. Research 
would, according to the Commission’s Framework for State Aid for Research and 
Development
85
 (hereinafter Research Framework), constitute a non-economic activity if it 
was ‘independent R&D for more knowledge and better understanding’. Activities ‘such as 
renting out equipment or laboratories to undertakings, supplying services to undertakings or 
performing contract research’, on the other hand, are activities of an economic nature. 
Generic funding provided by HEFCE and most public competitive funding for research in 
universities would thus be linked to a non-economic activity because universities undertake 
that research independently and in pursuance of more knowledge and better understanding; 
while contract research carried out by universities for public authorities would be of an 
economic nature
86
.   
However, in some cases it might be difficult to draw the line between competitive 
funding of a non-economic nature and a research service provided for a public authority, for 
example, when public calls are so specific that they could be interpreted as the public 
                                                 
85 Commission Communication ‘Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation’ OJ [2014] 
C 198/01. 
86 See with a more detailed assessment for research funding in three Member States A Gideon, ‘Blurring 
Boundaries between the Public and the Private in National Research Policies and Possible Consequences from EU 
Primary Law’ (2015) 11 Journal of Contemporary European Research 50.  
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authority actually commissioning a service. In such situations it would not matter if the 
authority is a government department or a dedicated funding body. It merely depends on 
the nature of the research. Thus, in this area there is no hard and fast rule that allows to 
determine whether research-related funding is exempted from compliance with the EU 
public procurement rules, and a case by case analysis will be necessary. As we will see 
below, if the research is of an economic nature and funded / awarded directly or in 
discriminatory ways, this could also constitute State aid (§3.B).  
Unlike its older version
87
, the new Research Framework explicitly lays out the 
rules that need to be adhered to when the state is commissioning economic research. 
Accordingly, if a public authority contracts research, it has to follow the public 
procurement rules
88
. Otherwise the price has at least to reflect the market value. It is 
assumed that such is, in particular, the case if the selection procedure is open, all rights and 
obligations are made available to everyone interested, there is no preferential treatment and 
either the results may be widely disseminated and the public purchaser gets the intellectual 
property rights (IPR) or the public purchaser gets free access to all IPR and other parties 
can get non-exclusive licenses for the market price
89
. Where this is not the case, ‘Member 
States may rely on an individual assessment of the terms of the contract between the public 
purchaser and the undertaking, without prejudice to the general obligation to notify 
R&D&I aid pursuant to Article 108(3) of the Treaty’
90
.  
Regarding compliance with the applicable procurement rules, Directive 2014/24 
contains specific provisions about how and when research needs to be procured. In Recital 
                                                 
87 Community framework for state aid for research and development and innovation OJ [2006] C 323/01 
88 Research Framework (n 85) para 32. 
89 Ibid, para 33. 
90 Ibid, para 34. 
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35, the Directive stresses the importance of co-funding of research by industry and declares 
that the Directive therefore only applies if there is no-co-funding, but, instead, the 
contracting authority receives all the results unless the co-funding or result sharing is only 
symbolic. If the contracting authority does receive all the results, the provider ‘having 
carried out those activities, […] [may still] publish an account thereof’. Recital 47 declares 
research and innovation to be ‘among the main drivers of future growth’ and makes an 
explicit connection to the Europe 2020 strategy. Public authorities are therefore encouraged 
to use procurement to ‘spur innovation’
91
. Directive 2014/24 should thus ‘contribute to 
facilitating public procurement of innovation and help Member States in achieving the 
Innovation Union targets’ in combination with the Pre-Commercial Procurement 
Communication
92
 which deals with procurement activities not falling under the public 
procurement directives. According to Article 14 Directive 2014/24, the Directive only 
applies to certain types of research
93
, which include those research services that seem to be 
relevant for universities: research and development services and related consultancy 
services, research and experimental development services, research services, research 
laboratory services, marine research services, experimental development services, design 
and execution of research and development, pre-feasibility study and technological 
demonstration and test and evaluation services. Further, as already stressed in Recital 35, 
                                                 
91 The usefulness of public procurement for innovation has indeed already been examined and found to be greater 
than that of direct subsidies. M Amann and M Essig, 'Public procurement of innovation: empirical evidence from 
EU public authorities on barriers for the promotion of innovation' (2015) online first Innovation: The European 
Journal of Social Science Research. For general discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Truly competitive public 
procurement as a Europe 2020 lever: what role for the principle of competition in moderating horizontal policies?’ 
(2016) 22(2) European Public Law Journal, forthcoming. 
92 Commission Communication ‘Pre-commercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high 
quality public services in Europe’ COM(2007) 799 final of 14 December 2007. 
93 Those which fall within CPV codes 73000000-2 to 73120000-9, 73300000-5, 73420000-2 and 73430000-5. 
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the research service has to be entirely for the public authority (i.e. it receives all the benefits 
and pays for it entirely).  
If we do have an economic research service for a public authority –no matter if it 
is a research council or a government department– whether or not a public procurement 
procedure would have had to be held would depend on the value of the contract. In so far 
the general thresholds in Article 4 of Directive 2014/24 apply to research, its rules will be 
applicable to contracts in excess of €134,000 (£111,676) for public service contracts 
awarded by central government authorities (including BIS and HEFCE according to Annex 
1 of the Directive itself) and €207,000 (£172,514) for public service contracts awarded by 
sub-central contracting authorities. Research procurement that does not fall under the 
Directive can still be assessed under the Pre-commercial Procurement Communication. 
This Communication suggest ‘an approach to procuring R&D services which involves risk-
benefit sharing and does not constitute State aid’
94
. The approach is based on risks and 
benefits sharing, competitive development in phases (i.e. a variety of companies can 
participate in the beginning the number of which will be limited in later phases) and the 
separation between the pre-commercial and the commercial phase. The use of this form of 
procurement is encouraged by Horizon 2020 and other EU research policy mechanisms
95
.   
 
3.B. Relation to state aid law 
The previous sections have clarified in which cases the commissioning of public 
services to English universities should comply with EU public procurement rules. This 
section explores some of the State aid implications of the English university funding system 
                                                 
94 Pre-commercial Procurement Communication para 5. 
95 Semple (n 8) para 1.29 
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and the interplay of state aid and public procurement. Generally, if an economic activity 
takes place, aid may not be provided selectively to undertakings if this distorts competition 
and affects trade between Member States. It is not the aim of this article to provide a 
detailed analysis of the English university funding regime under Article 107 TFEU. Suffice 
to say that, given the fact that some providers of higher education (universities) have access 
to HEFCE’s grants while others do not (alternative and commercial providers)96 and some 
research funding for economic activities might reach providers selectively, there are open 
questions regarding the general rules under Article 107 TFEU—and the selectivity of 
HEFCE’s funding scheme could come under significant pressure due to the lack of 
notification of HEFCE’s State aid scheme to fund higher education in England to the 
European Commission. We will limit the analysis here to the area where public 
procurement law and the state aid rules overlap. There are two points that might be worth 
mentioning at a preliminary phase of our analysis. First, that compliance with State aid law 
can take place in cases of breach of EU public procurement law
97
, and vice versa—although 
this second scenario is not commonly accepted
98
. And, second, that decisions concerning 
                                                 
96 See UCU briefing, The private providers’ ‘designation’ bonanza, February 2014, at 2: ‘Private providers cannot 
currently access the HEFCE administered funds’, available at 
http://www.ucu.org.uk/index.cfm?articleid=6975#.Vh_XEX6rSUk (last accessed October 15, 2015). See also 
HEFCE, Guide to funding 2015-16 (n 68) para 6, where it is stated that 'HEIs are bound by the requirements of 
their charter and statutes (or equivalent) and by the law relating to their charitable status' and para 29, where it is 
stressed that that the governing body of an HEI must assure that it 'delivers its charitable purpose for the public 
benefit'. Both aspects clearly seems to exclude the possibility of for-profit providers accessing HEFCE funding. 
On HEFCE's glossary page (n 66), the definition of 'Alternative provider’ strengthens this conclusion by indicating 
that it is ‘A general term for providers of higher education which are not funded by regular government grants. 
They can be or-profit or not-for-profit, and of any corporate form'. 
97 Indeed, it should be stressed that the absence of a tendering procedure does not preclude a finding that State aid 
and other competition rules have not been violated; see Olsen v Commission, T-17/02, EU:T:2005:218, confirmed 
on appeal by the CJEU, Olsen v Commission, C-320/05 P, EU:C:2007:573. 
98 For discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Public Procurement and State Aid: Reopening the Debate?’ (2012) 
21(6) Public Procurement Law Review 205-212. 
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State aid for this type of public services raise very high political stakes, which may have 
justified a (progressive) lack of intervention by the European Commission and the CJEU in 
recent years. 
For State aid rules to be regarded as infringed, teaching and research would need 
to be regarded as economic activities (in most cases SGEIs), since State support for non-
economic services in the terms of Article 2 of Protocol No 26 TFEU would not be caught 
by the prohibition of Article 107(1) TFEU. Our discussion is thus framed within the narrow 
area of State aid for SGEIs, where compliance with public procurement law can be utilised 
to avoid regarding economic activities funded by the State as actually receiving State aid 
for the purposes of Article 107 TFEU. The landmark case of Altmark
99
 essentially provided 
that recourse to public procurement law can avoid state aid accusations in such situations 
because the tendering of public contracts for the provision of the SGEIs is assumed to 
suppress any undue economic advantage that a direct award of the contract could have 
generated otherwise. More specifically, in Altmark, the CJEU determined that, together 
with the other three cumulative conditions, selecting the undertaking which is to discharge 
public service obligations ‘pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow 
for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the 
community’ excludes the existence of State aid100.  
Following this case, the so-called Altmark
101
 and Altmark II
102
  packages provide 
for assessment criteria to establish whether the Altmark conditions are fulfilled and, 
                                                 
99 Judgment of 24 July 2003 in Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415. 
100 Altmark, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, para 93. 
101 In 2005 the Commission adopted the first SGEI package, also known as the “Monti-Kroes-Package” setting out 
the conditions under which state aid in the form of public service compensation is compatible with the TFEU; see 
IP/05/937 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-05-937_en.htm (last accessed 1 November 2015). 
This package was replaced by the “Almunia package”, below (n 102). 
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consequently, there is no State aid in the funding of the provision of SGEIs (i.e. whether the 
public service obligation is clearly defined, the parameters on which the compensation is 
calculated are transparent and established in advance, the compensation is not excessive 
and the costs included in the calculation of the compensation are themselves reasonable)
103
. 
The current Altmark II
104
 package provides for an exemption of State aid control for SGEIs 
receiving support below €15 million per year. As discussed above, the value for 
procurement of higher education services is well above that figure. Thus, as far as the 
teaching activities of universities fall within the category of SGEIs, it seems clear that lack 
of compliance with procurement rules, in addition to an infringement of those rules in 
themselves, also opens up the possibility of an infringement of the applicable State aid rules 
                                                                                                                            
102 This is also known as the “Almunia package”, which refers to the instruments adopted by the European 
Commission between December 2011 and April 2012 for the modernisation of SGEI rules. These are: 1) 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Quality Framework for Services of General Interest in 
Europe, Brussels, 20.12.2011, COM(2011) 900 final; 2) the Commission Decision of 20 December 2011 on the 
application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to State aid in the form of 
public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general 
economic interest [OJ 2012/21/EU]; 3) Communication from the Commission on the application of the European 
Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest [OJ 
2012/C 8/02]; 4) Communication from the Commission—European Union framework for State aid in the form of 
public service compensation (2011) [OJ 2012/C 8/03]; and 5) Commission Regulation (EU) No 360/2012 of 25 
April 2012 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to 
de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing services of general economic interest [OJ 2012/L 114/8]. 
103 For discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘The Commission’s Modernization Agenda for Procurement and SGEI’, 
in E Szyszczak & J van de Gronden (eds), Financing Services of General Economic Interest: Reform and 
Modernization, Legal Issues of Services of General Interest Series (The Hague, TMC Asser Press / Springer, 
2012) 161-181. 
104 Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest OJ [2012] L 7/3. 
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unless a clear case of absence of over-compensation can be supported.
105
 For economic 
research services that remain below the €15 million per year threshold, this would mean 
that such services, if they are of general interest, would often be exempted from the state 
aid rules, though they may still fall under the public procurement regime (above §3.A.II).  
This interplay between state aid rules and public procurement rules (i.e. that 
recourse to a public procurement procedure can, in the case of SGEIs and under certain 
conditions, avoid state aid accusations) seems to have been broadened in the recent 
Spezzino case
106
. In this case, the Court had not tested whether the services directly 
contracted by the State (ambulance services) were economic in nature or not, which 
complicates its interpretation
107
. Nonetheless, the Court determined that the assignment of 
those services would ‘fall, in principle, within the scope of’ of the relevant procurement 
Directive
108
. The Court then went on to state that it was for the national court to decide if 
                                                 
105 This is likely to be an almost impossible test, particularly if the CJEU follows the path very recently set out in 
Germany v Commission (Zweckverband Tierkörperbeseitigung), C-446/14 P, EU:C:2016:97. For discussion, see A 
Sanchez-Graells, ‘CJEU Consolidates Push for Overcompliance with EU Public Procurement Rules in the 
Provision of Public Services (C-446/14)’, howtocrackanut, 19 February 2016, 
<http://www.howtocrackanut.com/blog/2016/02/cjeu-consolidates-push-for.html> accessed 9th March 2016. 
106 Spezzino, C-113/13, EU:C:2014:2440. 
107 Indeed, part of the reasoning of the Court in the Spezzino case seems to derive from the particular treatment of 
ambulance services under the relevant procurement rules (Directive 2004/18). This has been further complicated 
by the treatment of this services under Article 10 of Directive 2014/24, which raises questions about the 
delimitation of the effects of Spezzino for other types of social services, either economic or non-economic. For 
discussion of the complexities of the procurement treatment of ambulance services, see R Caranta, ‘The Changes 
to the Public Contract Directives and the Story they Tell about how EU Law Works’ (2015) 52(2) Common 
Market Law Review 391, 424 ff. See also R Caranta, ‘Mapping the margins of EU public contracts law: Covered, 
mixed, excluded and special contracts’, in F Lichère, R Caranta and S Treumer (eds), Modernising Public 
Procurement: The New Directive (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2014) 87 et seq. 
108 Spezzino Ibid para 38. 
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the entrustment of the activities in question would fall under the normal or light touch 
procurement regime or, if the relevant value thresholds were not met, they would fall 
outside the Directive entirely. In any case the Court stressed that regardless of the 
applicability of any specific procurement regime, the Treaty principles on transparency and 
equal treatment would still have to be taken into consideration if there was a cross-border 
interest in the entrustment of the services (see above §3.A.I)—which, again, was to be 
decided by the national court. If this was the case, the Court continued, the direct award of 
the services to voluntary, non-profit organisations would be an infringement of the free 
movement of services and the freedom of establishment.  
However, considering the primary responsibility of the Member States in the area 
of health care, the Court recognised that this infringement could be justified on the basis 
that the Member State was seeking to guarantee ‘sufficient permanent access to a balanced 
range of high-quality medical treatment and, secondly, assist in ensuring the desired 
control of costs and prevention, as far as possible, of any waste of financial, technical and 
human resources’109. This was considered a valid justification if the scheme in question 
actually did contribute to its ‘social purpose and the pursuit of the objective of the good of 
the community and budgetary efficiency’110. In this respect the Court emphasised that the 
voluntary organisations may not pursue other objectives, make any profit, pass any profits 
to their members or break any requirements for such organisations in national law. Whether 
these conditions were fulfilled was for the national Court to decide. This thus indicates that 
national law can directly award certain social services to voluntary, non-profit associations 
if they actually fulfil the social aim pursued in awarding the services to them and contribute 
                                                 
109 Ibid para 57. 
110 Ibid para 60. 
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to budgetary efficiency
111
. In so far, when it comes to such organisations, it is possible to 
avoid both the public procurement rules and state aid law (i.e. the Altmark test would not 
have to be conducted), since ‘it follows from the findings relating to the interpretation of 
EU law on public procurement that there is no need to examine […] [the matter] in 
relation to those rules on competition’112.  
The question for us then is whether this could be applied to universities. There 
certainly seems to be a cross-border interest for the provision of teaching and research 
services in many cases
113
 and it seems likely that, as explored above (§3.A), the 
procurement rules or the alternatives named in the Research Framework are applicable to 
certain economic research services and the light touch regime or at least the general Treaty 
principles are applicable to teaching services (unless the activity is entirely non-economic). 
If this is the case and such activities are directly awarded to local voluntary providers, there 
would be an infringement of the free movement of services and the freedom of 
establishment which could, potentially, be justified according to the Spezzino case law.  
As regards higher education, it is worth stressing that, as in the case of health care, 
this is also a primary responsibility of the Member States. Research, on the other hand, is a 
shared responsibility between the Member States and the European Union. Yet it is stressed 
in a specific caveat in Article 4(3) TFEU that ‘in the areas of research, technological 
development and space, the Union shall have competence to carry out activities, in 
particular to define and implement programmes; however, the exercise of that competence 
                                                 
111 On the question what ‘budgetary efficiency’ actually means and if it could be aligned with Altmark by 
interpreting it as the service provided by the non-profit organisation having to be equal or cheaper in costs than a 
typical undertaking see Sanchez-Graells (n 80). 
112 Spezzino para 64. 
113 See on various Court of Justice cases indicating that there is a cross-border link, Gideon (2015; n 73) and on the 
question of market definition across borders in EU competition law Gideon (2012; n 73).  
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shall not result in Member States being prevented from exercising theirs’. The last caveat 
seems to make the application of Spezzino possible from the perspective of extending its 
effects to core areas of Member State competence. In both cases, provision of education 
and research services through specific national providers could ensure equal access to 
education and knowledge and a high standard of both research and teaching activities, and 
thus serve a particular social purpose similar to the one in Spezzino.  
Yet, it seems questionable that universities can fulfil the more detailed criteria the 
Court outlined in Spezzino, namely that they are voluntary organisations, that they may 
pursue only the social objective assigned to them and that they may not make any profit. 
For starters the form universities take differs between the Member States. In England, 
where universities are largely third sector organisations (charities), they are usually not 
strictly non-profit, but not-for-profit organisations
114
. Secondly, universities pursue a 
variety of objectives and it differs between Member States if these are assigned to them in 
national legislation. In England, for example, research is not even a statutory task of 
universities and universities provide all sorts of services including housing, catering and a 
variety of other clearly economic services. It thus seems, at least in the case of English 
universities, unlikely that they can benefit from Spezzino directly, at least if interpreted 
strictly. However, as we have seen above, the light touch regime for educational services in 
Directive 2014/24 provides a similar, yet broader, provision allowing to assign contracts to 
certain organisations only.  
                                                 
114 On the definition of the notion of the third sector and the difference between non-profit and not-for-profit see I 
Wendt and A Gideon, 'Services of general interest provision through the third sector under EU competition law 
constraints: The example of organising healthcare in England, Wales and the Netherlands' in Schiek D, Liebert U 
and Schneider H (eds), European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon (Cambridge, 
CUP, 2011) 255 with further references.  
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Consequently, if following the Spezzino rationale narrowly
115
, it seems that an 
infringement by universities of the procurement rules (whether fully or as light touch 
regime) or of the Treaty principles respectively, would still also indicate an infringement of 
the requirement in Altmark that providers are selected ‘pursuant to a public procurement 
procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those 
services at the least cost to the community’. Yet, Spezzino is not the only case where the 
Court showed more leniency when an area of primary responsibility of the Member States 
was concerned. It might therefore also be conceivable that the Court would broaden the 
Spezzino rationale in future case law in the sense that the requirement for least-cost oriented 
public procurement can at least be reinterpreted towards a process capable to assist in 
ensuring a ‘sufficient permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality [services] and, 
secondly, […] the desired control of costs and prevention, as far as possible, of any waste 
of financial, technical and human resources’. This could suffice to relax both the 
procurement and State aid controls applicable to the commissioning of teaching and, to 
some extent, economic research activities to universities. However, exploring the full 
implications of this possibility exceeds the scope of this paper. 
 
3.C. Preliminary conclusion 
Member States which structure their higher education systems according to a 
market approach are likely to place higher education within the legal framework applicable 
to public services which constitute an economic activity. In that regard, in the case of 
England, we have seen how the entrustment and funding of the provision of higher 
education services within a contractual relationship between HEFCE and each university 
requires, in our opinion, compliance with the light touch regime created by Directive 
                                                 
115 It is worth also bearing in mind here, as mentioned in n 107, that it is unclear how far the case law can be 
applied to services other than ambulance services at all.  
 _____________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Copyleft – Ius Publicum 
46 
2014/24. Even if that was not the case, the Treaty principles of non-discrimination and 
transparency would still apply unless the services would have to be regarded as entirely 
non-economic which seems unlikely. However, recent case law of the CJEU indicates its 
reluctance to get involved in areas of primary responsibility of the Member States, which 
may well result in an absence of practical consequences following from a lack of 
compliance with those EU procurement rules and principles. Certainty might only be 
achieved through case law in the future.  
As regards research, non-economic research (which will comprise most publicly 
funded research) does not have to be commissioned on the basis of any procurement 
procedure. Research constituting an economic activity, if it is entirely for the contracting 
authority and its value exceeds the threshold of Article 4 of Directive 2014/24 needs to be 
commissioned through a full-fledged public procurement procedure (ie not under the light 
touch regime). Otherwise, in addition to infringing public procurement law, this could 
amount to the granting of State aid, unless it followed the procedure described in paragraph 
33 of the Research Framework mentioned above (§3.A.II) or is notified to the Commission 
as a State aid measure and cleared according to that framework.  
Our discussion has also assessed funding for both economic education and 
research under the State aid rules applicable to SGEIs. For these to apply, the economic 
teaching and research services would need to be of general interest and assigned in a clear 
entrustment act to the undertakings in question. Within this framework, our analysis has 
shown that there is a clear safeguard for acts of such research and teaching services that can 
be valued below €15 million a year, in which case there is no need to carry out any further 
assessment. This should exclude State aid implications in the case of most economic 
research contracts provided they are of general interest. Regarding economic education 
services, this means that providers that receive support in excess of that amount need to be 
chosen on the basis of the public procurement rules or, alternatively, be able to make a clear 
and compelling case of absence of over-compensation. We have also assessed to what 
extent this requirement can be relaxed on the basis of the recent Spezzino case. While a 
strict interpretation of that case seems to indicate that universities cannot profit from it, the 
Court has in recent case law shown a more lenient approach to the application of directly 
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applicable EU law to areas of primary responsibility of the Member States and it seems 
thus possible that the Spezzino rationale could be broadened. However, in this point, legal 
certainty will require future case law. 
In addition, and in the light of the fact that Directive 2014/24 in recital 114 points 
to the provisions on SGEIs, it might more generally be possible to argue that the application 
of the Treaty rules would obstruct the performance of the services of general interest in 
question. As regards higher education, strictly applying the principles of non-discrimination 
and thus potentially having to fund foreign and / or private providers of higher education 
would arguably threaten the performance, viability and quality of the national higher 
education system. For research this seem less likely, as only economic research falls under 
the provisions in the first place and if economic research is being conducted on a market, it 
would not appear that generally the application of the Treaty rules would obstruct the 
performance. Aside from this, however, the new Research Framework and the new General 
Block Exemption Regulation (GBER)
116
 provide for generous exemptions for research 
from the application of state aid law. 
 
4. WHEN CAN UNIVERSITIES UTILISE IN-HOUSE OR PUBLIC-
PUBLIC EXEMPTIONS? 
 
In view of the significant constraints that EU public procurement rules impose on 
universities both as buyers (§2) and providers (§3), it is worth exploring legal avenues to 
create some flexibility in the system. Thus, this section will conduct an assessment of the 
exemptions for public-public cooperation or in-house arrangements that could shield 
                                                 
116 Commission Regulation 651/2014/EU declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in 
application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty OJ [2014] L 187/1. 
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universities from competition by non-public and commercial providers (§4.A). It will also 
assess in how far these exemptions are useful for universities when commissioning services 
themselves (§4.B). 
 
4.A. Universities as providers  
If we assume that, at least in some cases, universities would be providers of 
research or educational services for a contracting authority and thus fall under the public 
procurement rules (§3), there are still exemptions for public-public cooperation or in-house 
arrangements that could shield universities from competition by non-public and commercial 
providers. Article 12 of Directive 2014/24 provides that public-public cooperation 
mechanisms are excluded from the public procurement rules if they are based on 
cooperation between public authorities to perform public services together in the public 
interest and less than 20% of those activities are offered by the cooperating public 
authorities on the open market. In turn, in-house arrangements are excluded if the 
contracting authority exercises control similar to the one it exercises over its own 
departments over the service providing entity, and the entity
117
 must carry out the essential 
part of its activities for the authority (at least 80%)
118
. The control element is important, as, 
when there is such control, the situation is more similar to an integrated system where the 
                                                 
117 This requirement includes that there must be no private participation whatsoever, with the only exception of 
non-blocking private participation mandated by law in the service providing entity. 
118 See J Wiggen, ‘Public procurement rules and cooperation between public sector entities: the limits of the in-
house doctrine under EU procurement law’ (2011) 20 Public Procurement Law Review 157; J Wiggen, ‘Public 
procurement law and public-public co-operation: reduced flexibility but greater legal certainty ahead? The 
Commission's Staff Working Paper on the application of EU public procurement law to relations between 
contracting authorities and the 2011 proposal for a new Directive’ (2012) 21 Public Procurement Law Review 
NA225; and J Wiggen, ‘Directive 2014/24/EU: the new provision on co-operation in the public sector’ (2014) 23 
Public Procurement Law Review 83. 
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authority provides the service itself rather than to a market situation
119
. The in-house 
arrangement can be exercised jointly by more than one public authority, indirectly through 
another controlled entity, inverted (i.e. the controlled entity is the one contracting to the 
controlling entity) or horizontal (i.e. a contract is awarded to another entity which is 
controlled by the same mother entity)
120
.   
In the case of universities, the in-house providing exemption might be a useful 
avenue for the state to avoid having to use a public procurement procedure to allow 
universities to conduct education and research services. For this exemption to apply, there 
would thus need to be control of the university by the state and the university would need to 
conduct the vast majority of its activities for the contracting authority (i.e. be economically 
dependent)
121
. However, in the case of universities and in view of their inherent autonomy, 
establishing control is a difficult task. Indeed, a literal interpretation of the recent 
Datenlotsen
122
 case might give the impression that control cannot be present in the 
university-state relationship. This case concerned a potential horizontal in-house 
relationship and was decided before Directive 2014/24 entered into force. The Court here 
rejected the horizontal relationship, which is now explicitly foreseen. However, the Court 
did continue that  
                                                 
119 R Cavallo Perrin and D Casalini, 'Control over In-house Providing Organisations' (2009) 18 Public 
Procurement Law Review 227.  
120 For a critique on the new rules see A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules 
(Hart 2015)  p. 252 seq, 265-272, WA Janssen, 'The institutionalised and non-institutionalised exemptions from 
EU public procurement law: Towards a more coherent approach?' (2014) 10 Utrecht Law Review 168. For a 
summary of the old rules including the case law see European Commission, 'Concerning the application of EU 
public procurement law to relations between contracting authorities (public-public-cooperation)' (2011) 
SEC(2011) 1169 final Commission Staff Working Paper, Cavallo Perrin and Casalini (n 119). 
121 On the economic dependency see further European Commission (n 120) p. 6 seq. 
122 Judgment of 8 May 2014 in Datenlotsen Informationssysteme, C-15/13, EU:C:2014:303. 
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in any event […] the City of Hamburg is not in a position to exercise “similar control” 
over the University. The control exercised by the City of Hamburg over the University 
extends only to part of its activity, that is to say, solely in matters of procurement, but not to 
education and research, in which the University has a large degree of autonomy. 
Recognising the existence of “similar control” in such a situation of partial control would 
run counter to the case-law cited […]. In those circumstances, there is no need to 
examine whether the exception concerning in-house awards is capable of applying to so-
called “horizontal in-house transactions” […]123. 
It might thus be conceivable that the Court would continue to reject a relationship 
of control even if it will now have to recognise the existence of the horizontal relationship. 
Yet, this does not seem to take into account the specific situations of universities. By their 
very nature universities have to be able to exercise academic freedom. It seems absurd that 
this in itself should take them out of the in-house exception. Instead, it seems preferable to 
follow the approach suggested by the Advocate General who proposed that    
the autonomy which the universities enjoy in relation to teaching and research is the 
expression of the freedom of teaching and research, a principle that is set out […] in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 13 of which provides that 
arts and scientific research are to be free of constraint and that academic freedom must be 
respected. From that perspective […] in order for entities such as the universities to be 
eligible for the in-house exemption, it cannot be required that control should be exercised 
over their teaching and research activities also, since the autonomy of the universities in 
relation to those activities is an expression of values of a constitutional nature common to 
the legal systems of the Member States and enshrined in the Charter. […] It follows from 
the foregoing considerations that […] the similar control exercised must extend to all of the 
                                                 
123 Ibid, paras 31-33; emphasis added. 
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contractor’s activities, except for the special rights and powers which the universities enjoy 
in the areas of teaching and research
124
. 
It therefore seems sensible to revise the Datenlotsen judgment in its entirety and 
relax the control requirement in the sense that the Advocate General suggested, which 
would still mean that universities would have to be controlled in all other areas except 
teaching and research. With the change in legislation there seems scope for this. Since the 
new Directive has extended significantly the scope for public-public cooperation and relies 
on arguments of a nature different than in-house as traditionally conceptualised by the 
Court, the Court could interpret Article 12(2) of Directive 2014/24 as not necessarily 
encompassing only the sort of control that Article 12(1) consolidates. In that regard, the 
control exercised over universities as described by the Advocate General may well suffice 
in ‘new’ scenarios of the in-house exemption. Once more, new case law will be necessary 
to shed light on the issue. 
Nevertheless, even the control requirement as established by the Advocate General 
does not seem to be the present in all university systems. In England, universities are 
legally independent entities
125
 over which government influence is mainly exercised 
through steering through funding and issuing general legislation rather than any form of 
direct control. They ‘are exceptionally autonomous’, ranking in the top three of the 
European University Association’s University Autonomy Tool126. Accordingly, they are 
entirely free from an organisational point of view, and able to decide completely 
                                                 
124 Opinion of the Advocate General Mengozzi of 23 January 2014 in Datenlotsen, C-15/13, EU:C:2014:23, para 
73. 
125 D Palfreyman, 'The English chartered university/college: how 'autonomous', how 'independent' and how 
'private'?' (2003) 15 Education and the Law 149. 
126 European University Association, 'United Kingdom' (2015) <http://www.university-
autonomy.eu/countries/united-kingdom/> accessed 21st August 2015. 
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independently upon structure, dismissals, creation of governing boards, etc. Except for the 
cap on fees and the requirement of approval before taking a large loan, they are equally free 
financially and as regards staffing they only need to negotiate salary for certain categories 
of staff with unions, but there are no requirements from the government
127
. In such as 
system, it seems likely that the control element is not given even if the broader approach 
suggested by the Advocate General was to be followed. 
 
4.B. Universities as buyers 
When it comes to the subjection of universities as buyers to compliance with the 
EU public procurement rules (§2), alternative organisational decisions could also provide a 
secondary opportunity to avoid direct compliance with EU public procurement rules by 
means of public-public cooperation or in-house arrangements (for example when 
purchasing services from a wholly owned spin-off which the university controls). This 
would, of course, depend on the individual case and an assessment of the extent to which 
the university exercises a control that is similar to the one it has over its own units would be 
required. For example, control might be limited if a holding company is involved
128
.  
In addition, the generous exemptions in the new Research Framework also seem to 
largely exclude research transactions with spin-offs or in public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
from State aid control if all profits are reinvested or the cooperation is genuine respectively. 
This seems to underline the Commission’s decision in Sarc129 in which it followed a very 
generous approach towards the low royalties a spin-off paid their parent university. On a 
                                                 
127 Ibid. 
128 Janssen (n 120).  
129 See Judgment of the General Court of 12 June 2014 in Sarc v Commission, T-488/11, EU:T:2014:497. 
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complaint by a competitor, the General Court denied the competitor standing, though it 
would have seemed likely that on substance this could have constituted State aid. One 
might interpret this as the General Court (and the Commission) showing some restraint in 
an area where, despite the shared competence due to the caveat in Article 4(3) TFEU, the 
Member States remain largely responsible for the establishment and implementation of 
research policies. A more cynical interpretation, however, might be that the General Court 
simply did not want to conduct a complicated economic analysis if not backed by the 
Commission and rather dismiss the claim on procedural grounds than opening proceedings 
for un-notified aid. 
Generally, the new rules in the public procurement Directive 2014/24 as well as in 
the Research Framework seem to indicate that the Union legislator wanted to give more 
leeway to universities for alternative organisational arrangements such as spin-offs and 
PPPs. This might be due to the fact that, at least as regards research, these are explicitly 
encouraged by EU policy
130
. In addition, the affected policy areas are (often) of primary 
responsibility of the Member States and a certain discretion is therefore envisaged. Yet, it 
was realised that such arrangements bear the possibility of contradicting directly applicable 
EU law, as they become increasingly market-oriented. Member States then feel the EU 
rules on, inter alia, procurement and competition have interfered too much with areas of 
primary responsibility which they wish to protect, which is why the legislator introduced 
increasing exemptions. For example, the Commission had initially suggested that 90% of 
activities of a controlled entity needed to be conducted for the controlling entity to make 
use of the in-house exemption, but during the legislative process this went down to 80%
131
. 
It could be asked whether this approach is not potentially simply more complicated, still 
leaves the possibility of tensions with primary law and, once a service has reached a certain 
degree of marketization, disadvantages competitors. However, as the law stands, it seems 
                                                 
130 Gideon (n Errore. Il segnalibro non è definito.) with further references.  
131 Janssen (n 120). 
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that universities have significant leeway to enter into in-house provision arrangements with 
spin-off companies they control, especially if profits are reinvested, which may be an area 
susceptible of attracting significant attention by universities in their strategic plans in terms 
of promotion of innovation and its commercial exploitation by universities. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has assessed the extent to which universities are bound to comply with 
EU public procurement and State aid rules, both as purchasers (§2) and providers (§3). The 
analysis has included a consideration of public-public cooperation and in-house provision 
exceptions to the general rules (§4). It has carried out this analysis on the basis of the 
regulatory framework applicable to English universities as a case study, as well as by 
means of a critical assessment of recent legislative modifications and new strings of case 
law of the CJEU. Our main findings and conclusions are as follows. 
When universities act as buyers, they are bound to comply with EU public 
procurement law if they are classified as ‘contracting authorities’. Following the test in the 
University of Cambridge case, universities will be regarded as contracting authorities when 
they are bodies governed by public law and this will fundamentally depend on whether they 
receive more than 50% of their funding from public sources. Our assessment of the English 
reform of higher education funding arrangements has shown that despite the introduction of 
significant student fees, the funding channelled to universities by the Department of 
Business, Innovation and Skills through the Students Loan Company does not detract from 
its public nature. Thus, if together with other sources of public funding, the funding 
received from the SLC exceeds 50% of their overall revenue, English universities remain 
bound to comply with EU public procurement rules in their role as buyers and this situation 
is likely to remain in the future. This case study is interesting for other EU Member States 
considering changes in the way they fund their universities. In simple terms, our analysis 
shows that unless they take a full arms’ length approach and make universities bear 
commercial risks derived from the lack of public guarantee for the payment of student fees, 
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universities will remain bound to comply with EU public procurement rules. This can be 
perceived as a disadvantage where the provision of higher education services is opened to 
competition by alternative providers, including for-profit providers, which may support the 
possibility to create a mechanism of exception for activities exposed to competition similar 
to the one existing under the special EU rules applicable to utilities procurement. If the 
funding from commercial income (e.g. funding for economic services provided to the 
public, private or third sector income, or income from student fees paid directly by home or 
international students) outweighs the public funding received through the SLC and other 
public income, universities would, on the other hand, not be bound by public procurement 
law anymore.  
When universities act as providers of teaching and research services, our analysis 
has indicated that they can only be directly entrusted with the provision of teaching or 
research activities that can be conceptualised as services of a non-economic nature. 
Conversely, where these activities are of an economic nature because they are provided 
under conditions of market competition—and, in the case of research, the contracting 
authority retains all value derived from specific research projects—their entrustment to 
universities need to comply with the EU public procurement rules. In the case of higher 
education teaching activities in England, we have shown that these, in our opinion, could be 
classified as economic in nature and that the funding arrangements amount to contractual 
relationships. Consequently, HEFCE should subject the award of teaching funding through 
grants to the light touch regime created by Directive 2014/24. Even if our assessment of the 
contractual nature of the relationships was inaccurate and such light touch regime was not 
applicable, HEFCE would still need to comply with the general principles of transparency 
and non-discrimination, which would complicate certain aspects of the organisations of 
those arrangements, such as the imposition of an absolute exclusion of non-English 
universities—and would need to be assessed under the rules applicable to State aid and, in 
particular of State aid for SGEIs (as discussed below). As regards research activities we 
submit that most publicly funded research will be of a non-economic nature since it is 
conducted ‘for more knowledge and better understanding’. Yet, if a more clearly defined 
piece of research which could be conducted on a market by a private provider is 
commissioned by the state, it does constitute an economic activity regardless of how it is 
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labelled. In these that cases, the assessment could thus become a more complicated 
endeavour. If the assessment established that the activity is economic in nature it would 
need to comply with the Procurement Directive or the alternative arrangements under the 
Research Framework. Research procurement that does not fall under these instruments can 
still be assessed under the Pre-commercial Procurement Communication. 
We have restricted our State aid analysis to the cases where state aid law and 
public procurement rules overlap, which is mainly in the framework applicable to services 
of general economic interest (SGEI). Where teaching and research services can be 
conceptualised as non-economic services of general interest, we have submitted that State 
aid control does not apply. Under the SGEI framework, we have stressed that the high safe 
harbour threshold of €15 million in the Altmark II package comes to leave most awards for 
economic research activities outside the remit of control of the State aid rules. Where that 
threshold is exceed, which we assume is the case with most awards connected to teaching 
activities, at least in England, our analysis has shown how compliance with the applicable 
procurement rules becomes a key element for the assessment under the State aid rules as 
well. Following Altmark, unless there has been a procurement exercise for the selection of 
the undertaking providing the SGEI, it is necessary to prove that there is no excessive 
compensation. This may be difficult to do, thus creating a risk of infringement of EU State 
aid rules in the way HEFCE funds English universities. Nonetheless, even though a strict 
interpretation of Spezzino would probably not include universities because they are not 
strictly non-profit and provide a vast range of activities, we have considered that, in the 
light of recent CJEU case law more generally, there may be scope to discuss if a relaxation 
of this strict assessment is possible, so as to consider compliance where the way the SGEI 
is procured is able to ensure ‘sufficient permanent access to a balanced range of high-
quality [higher education services] and, secondly, […] the desired control of costs and 
prevention, as far as possible, of any waste of financial, technical and human resources’. 
This may also feed back into the interpretation of the requirements derived from the light 
touch regime we consider applicable to economic teaching activities. 
Finally, we have explored whether exceptions based on public-public cooperation 
or in-house provision could be used to create flexibility for universities. Our analysis has 
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shown how universities as providers are unlikely to qualify for either of these exceptions. 
Looking in particular to the in-house exception, the current interpretation by the CJEU 
seems to exclude this possibility due to the academic freedom inherent in the status of 
universities. Moreover, even if, as we advocate, a more nuanced approach defended by 
Advocate General Mengozzi was adopted, this would be ineffectual in the case of English 
universities, which score amongst the top three most independent in the European Union. 
The reverse situation seems to arise where universities are buyers and seek to commission 
services or supplies from spin-off companies under their control. In this case, we have seen 
that the applicable rules create significant leeway by shielding universities from public 
procurement as well as state aid rules, which may well influence the use of such spin-off 
companies for the purposes of channelling and commercially exploiting the results of 
university research. 
Overall, when it comes to the case of English universities as buyers, our analysis 
shows that the question whether they are bound by public procurement rules depends on the 
amount of commercial income they receive. As summarised above, the funding received 
from the SLC is, in our opinion, to be regarded as public. In contrast, given that, according 
to our analysis, the teaching funding from HEFCE needs to be subjected to the public 
procurement rules’ light touch regime—and in case such procurement exercise is carried 
out by HEFCE in the future—this can be considered as commercial income. Equally, 
tuition fees which are actually directly paid by students (home and international) are to be 
considered commercial income. As regards research, funding provided for non-economic 
research activities is public, while we argue that funding for economic research activities is 
commercial income; even if the purchaser is a public body. In addition, most other income 
by universities, for example through the provision of accommodation services, or the direct 
or indirect exploitation of shops and hospitality premises will equally be commercial 
income. Ultimately, thus, the subjection of English universities to EU public procurement 
rules as buyers depends on an exact calculation of all these income streams, so as to 
determine whether public funding outweighs their commercial income or not. This may 
well differ between universities depending on the significance of the individual funding 
streams.  
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Universities and HEFCE are also bound to comply with the light touch regime in 
Directive 2014/24 in the provision of higher education services, as well as with the full-
fledged procurement regime or the alternative provided in the Research Framework in the 
provision of economic research activities. Thus, we have identified a risk of on-going 
infringement of EU procurement rules if a strict approach is adopted. A similar risk has 
been identified regarding EU State aid rules, at least as funding for teaching is concerned. 
We have also raised the point that this risk is difficult to assess and its actualization will 
crucially depend on the interpretation by the CJEU, which has recently signalled in 
Spezzino a clear lack of willingness to interfere with Member States’ organisation of public 
services if it can find a way to accommodate soft compliance or approximate compliance 
with their goals. Thus, this is an area where only future case law can clarify the doubts that 
may remain in our analyses. 
More generally, when it comes to the applicability of EU public procurement and 
State aid rules to universities, the paper has shown how decisions concerning the way 
universities are funded and the degree of competition between providers of higher 
education services that a Member State allows or facilitates are the two key elements for the 
analysis. Thus, Member States seeking to establish a framework where universities are not 
subjected to procurement and State aid rules in any specific way may want to reconsider the 
interaction between funding decisions and legal frameworks for universities market 
activities. In the country of our case study, England, this has recently gained even more 
significance with the issuing of a new green paper
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 during the time of writing which 
attempts to continue the path towards marketization of universities. Our analysis can thus 
inform any further future reforms of the way in which English universities are funded and 
the interaction between their funding status and their subjection to EU public procurement 
and State aid rules. 
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